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Textualism and the Constitution
Textualism and Federalism
TRANSLATING FEDERALISM: A TEXTUALIST REACTION
Gregory E. Maggs*
I. Introduction
Patterns of commerce in this country have changed remarkably since
the states ratified the Constitution in 1789. Two centuries ago, many
businesses were localized because distant transactions were impractical.1
Over the past two centuries, however, technological advances have
diminished the significance of geographic separation. As a result, enterprises in different states now often compete with one another and very few
commercial activities have only local effects. Indeed, the level of integration in our economy today surely exceeds what anyone could have foreseen
in the eighteenth century.2
The increasingly interstate character of commerce has altered the
balance of power between the states and the federal government regarding
regulation of the economy. Although Congress’s power to regulate
“Commerce . . . among the several States”3 might have had limited
importance when interstate commerce was less prevalent, the Clause has
become increasingly significant as markets have become so closely
connected. Now almost any substantial economic activity affects commerce
in more than one state.4

*
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author thanks the numerous participants at the Sympo sium who o ffered suggestions.
1
See L arry K rame r, W hat’s a Constitution for Anyway?, 46 Case W. Res. L.
Rev. 885 , 919 (1996).
2
See Stephen R. McAllister, Is There a Judicially Enforceable L imit to
Congressional Power under the Commerce Clause?, 44 U. Kan. L. Rev. 217, 229
(1996).
3
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
4
See T hom as Reed P owell, The Child Labor Law, the Tenth Amend ment, and
the Comm erce Clause, 3 S.L.Q. 175, 201 (19 18) (explaining how the power of
Congress expands under the Commerce Clause as the market becomes more
integrated); Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America 56-57 (199 0) (noting that
Congress now ma y regulate the “most trivial and local activities” if all that matters
is whethe r the activity has an effect on interstate comm erce).
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Professor Lawrence Lessig recently analyzed this development. In his
rich and important article, Translating Federalism: United States v Lopez5
(“Translating Federalism”), Lessig strives to explain how the Supreme
Court has interpreted and should interpret the Commerce Clause to address
the changing character of our national economy. In the process, he
advances two ambitious and provocative claims.
Lessig first asserts that the Supreme Court has sought to control the
expansion of federal power by “translating” the Commerce Clause instead
of following the Clause’s textual meaning.6 He explains that the Court has
not allowed Congress to regulate all “Commerce . . . among the several
States” *1199 because that literal reading of the Commerce Clause would
give Congress the ability to regulate almost everything, and the Framers
never intended for Congress to have so much power.7 Instead, according
to Lessig, the Court has attempted to translate--or update--the Clause to
maintain a balance of power between the federal and state governments as
“envisioned in the framing generation.”8 In this way, he says, the Court
may preserve the original function of the Commerce Clause despite
departing from the Clause’s literal meaning.9 Lessig cites the Court’s
recent decision in United States v. Lopez,10 which struck down the
Gun-Free School Zones Act of 199011 (“the Act”), as his principal example
of how the Supreme Court translates the Commerce Clause.12
Second, Lessig proclaims that, as a normative matter, the Supreme
Court should engage actively in this type of translation.13 In his view, the
Court shows greater fidelity to the Constitution by reading it in ways that
preserve the document’s original function than the Court exhibits by strictly
following the document’s text. 14 Lessig explains that translation serves to
“reestablish something ratifiers of the Constitution chose, eroded by

5

Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v Lopez, 1995 Sup.
Ct. Re v. 125.
6
See id . at 130 .
7
See id .
8
See id .
9
See id .
10
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
11
Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1702, 104 Stat. 4789, 4844-45 (1990) (codified as
amended at 18 U .S.C. § 922 (q)(2 )(A) (199 4)).
12
See L essig, sup ra note 5, at 194-2 14.
13
See id . at 130 -31.
14
See id .
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changes that no one chose, to ensure that something of the original structure
survives these unchosen changes.”15
Lessig’s article makes a substantial contribution to the ongoing debate
about how courts should react to changed circumstances when deciding
constitutional cases. Ultimately, however, I disagree with both of Lessig’s
claims. The Supreme Court, in my view, did not translate the Commerce
Clause in Lopez, but instead decided the case in a textualist manner.16 In
addition, for reasons that I will explain, the Court generally should read the
Clause according to the text’s original meaning and should not attempt to
translate it.17
II. Lessig’s Contribution
Lessig’s theory warrants attention, even from textualists who disagree
with his ultimate conclusions, because Lessig agrees with one of textualism’s central assumptions: the Supreme Court’s decisions must be
judged by their *1200 faithfulness to the Constitution.18 As described
above, Lessig supports attempts to translate the Commerce Clause because
he believes that the Court often can show greater fidelity to the Constitution
through translation than it could by reading the Constitution’s text literally
and ignoring historical developments. 19
Not all scholars share Lessig’s premise about maintaining fidelity. For
instance, in response to Lessig and others, Professor Michael J. Klarman
recently has argued that the Constitution does not deserve our loyalty at
all.20 He reasons that we differ substantially from the Framers in ideology
and material circumstances, 21 noting that political assumptions and
economic conditions have changed a great deal since the 1780s. 22 For these
reasons, Klarman contends that the Framers simply do not have “much of

15

Id. at 135. Professor Lessig has developed his theory of translation in a series
of articles. See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1365
(1997); Lawrence Lessig, F idelity in T ranslatio n, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 1165 (1993);
Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Read ings: Fidelity and Theo ry, 47 Stan.
L. Rev. 395 (1995 ).
16
See infra Pa rt III.
17
See infra Pa rt IV.
18
See Lessig, supra note 5, at 131 (noting that “[f]idelity is the dominant
mod ality of constitutional interpre tation”).
19
See id .
20
See M ichael J. Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 S. C al. L. Re v. 381, 38 1 (1997 ).
21
See id . at 383 -85.
22
See id . at 385 -86.
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relevance to say about how we should govern ourselves today.”23 Professor
Cass Sunstein recently has expressed similar skepticism about fidelity to
the Constitution.24
Klarman and others who disagree with Lessig’s insistence on fidelity
have an interesting theory. Perhaps, after all these years, our Constitution
does not warrant our loyalty for the various reasons that Klarman and
others point out. Yet, for better or for worse, the Justices already have
decided that the Constitution deserves fidelity; indeed, they swore to
uphold and defend the document upon taking office. Consequently, in
rendering their decisions, the Justices primarily care about how they should
exhibit their allegiance to the Constitution, not whether the document
should continue to govern us.25 Lessig has something to say about this
question; Klarman and other critics of fidelity do not.
Lessig’s effort to evaluate the Court’s work in terms of its faithfulness
to the Constitution leads to the principal contribution of his article. He
adds to the debate about textualism by observing that judges might strive
to be faithful to the Constitution in more than just one way. Textualists
should keep this important idea in mind.
In legal thinking, disagreements often arise not because people have
different goals, but because they have different conceptions of the same
goal. Consider, for example, the desire for equality in the law. One way
to promote equality is to treat everyone the same. Another is to treat people
differently based on their differing circumstances. Both methods promote
equality; they simply advance alternative visions of what equality means.
The same idea holds true for the goal of fidelity. As Lessig explains, the
Supreme Court can be faithful to the Constitution in two ways. The Court
*1201 can follow the text strictly or it can attempt to translate the text so
that the Constitution serves the functions that the Framers envisioned.26
Although the two approaches may lead to different outcomes, textualist
critics cannot fault the Court for unfaithfulness merely because the Justices

23

Id. at 387.
See Cass Sunstein, The Partial Constitution 100 (1993) (arguing that
“agreement on the document many generations ago is insufficient” to warrant
loyalty to it in mode rn times).
25
See Gre go ry E . M aggs, Yet Still Partial to It, 103 Yale L.J. 1627 (1994)
(making a related argume nt in response to Sunstein).
26
See L essig, sup ra note 5, at 127.
24
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choose one approach over another. Arguments against translation must lie
elsewhere. 27
III. Translation in Commerce Clause Cases
Although Lessig makes a valuable contribution with his discussion of
how translation might maintain fidelity, I disagree with his principal claim
that the Court recently has been attempting to translate the Commerce
Clause. Lessig, as noted above, cites United States v. Lopez28 as his
foremost example, but his characterization of the case troubles me. As I
read Lopez, the Court struck down a federal statute based on a textual
reading of the Commerce Clause and did not employ translation to reach its
conclusion.
Lopez came before the Supreme Court in 1994. In the case, the Justices
had to decide whether Congress had the power to enact the Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990.29 The Act prohibited an individual “knowingly
to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable
cause to believe, is a school zone.”30 Although the Court had not struck
down a federal statute under the Commerce Clause in more than half a
century,31 this case seemed different from the start.
During the oral argument, it appeared that the government was going
to lose and that the Court was going to strike down the Act under a literal
reading of the text of the Constitution. Justice Scalia acknowledged that
the Court had not always been “too strict” in determining the reach of the
Commerce Clause.32 He candidly acknowledged that “if Congress says
some commercial activity is interstate commerce, or affects interstate
commerce, that’s okay. But here you have regulation of something that is
not commercial activity in any sense of the word, but merely the possession
of an item.”33

27

See infra Pa rt IV.
514 U .S. 549 (1995 )
29
See id . at 551 .
30
Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1702, 104 Stat. 4789, 4844 (1990) (codified as
amended at 18 U .S.C. § 922 (q)(2 )(A) (199 4)).
31
The Court last struck down a federal statute as exceeding the power of
Congress under the Co mmerce C lause in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238
(1936).
32
See Transcript of Oral Argument, 1994 W L 7589 50, at *7 (U.S. 1994),
United States v. Lo pez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (No . 93-1 260 ).
33
Id. at *8.
28
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Solicitor General Drew Days faltered at this point in the argument. He
could not explain in a manner convincing to the Justices how the statute
involved either “commerce” or any activity “among the states.” 34 He also
could not explain satisfactorily how Congress’s power under the Commerce
Clause would be limited in any way if the Court interpreted the Clause as
granting Congress the power to pass the Act. Solicitor General Days could
identify few areas that the Commerce Clause would not permit Congress
to *1202 reach if the definition of commerce was so broad that it included
possession of a firearm.35
After the oral argument, the Court’s decision to invalidate the Act came
as little surprise. In the first paragraph of its opinion, the Court announced
its conclusion that “[t]he Act neither regulates a commercial activity nor
contains a requirement that the possession be connected in any way to
interstate commerce. We hold that the Act exceeds the authority of
Congress ‘[t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several States . . . .”’ 36
In explaining its holding, the majority opinion cited Commerce Clause
decisions as old as Gibbons v. Ogden37 and as recent as Preseault v. ICC.38
The majority then concluded that there was no precedent interpreting the
Clause in a way that would encompass gun possession in school zones.39
The Act, the Court reasoned, did not address commerce, the instrumentalities of commerce, or anything having a substantial effect on commerce.40
Unlike Lessig, I do not see any attempt by the Court to translate the
Commerce Clause in order to preserve its function in modern times. I
would characterize the Court’s decision as textual because, as the opinion’s
initial paragraph indicates, the holding rests on the literal language of the
Commerce Clause. The Constitution empowers Congress to regulate
interstate commerce, but the Act did not regulate commerce. In the end, the
Court concluded that something it would not have characterized as
commerce in the eighteenth or nineteenth century likewise should not be
viewed as commerce in the twentieth century. The Court did not update the
Commerce Clause to reach its conclusion despite all of the changes that
have produced our modern economy.

34

See id . at *8-10 .
See id . at *10-2 0.
36
United States v. Lopez, 514 U .S. 549, 551 (199 5) (quoting U.S. Const. art.
I, § 8, cl. 3).
37
22 U .S. (9 W heat.) 1 (1824).
38
494 U.S. 1 (19 90).
39
See L ope z, 514 U .S. at 56 1-63 .
40
See id . at 561 .
35
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Lessig offers two counterarguments for why we should consider Lopez
an exercise of translation. First, he contends that the Court was looking for
a way to read the Commerce Clause that would preserve for the states some
of the power that they enjoyed when the Constitution first took effect.41 As
evidence, he quotes the Court’s statement: “[I]f we were to accept the
Government’s arguments, we are hard pressed to posit any activity by an
individual that Congress is without power to regulate.”42
This argument is unpersuasive. Although the Court’s statement reveals
concern for the original function of the Commerce Clause, it does not show
that the Court engaged in translation. As noted, the Court held that
possession of a gun did not constitute commerce--the same conclusion that
it would have reached two centuries ago. At best, the statement quoted by
Lessig demonstrates that the Court refused to abandon its original
understanding*1203 of the text in part because such a departure would
change the text’s function.43
Second, Lessig argues that the Court engaged in translation because it
failed to consider the Necessary and Proper Clause.44 Although the Court
did overlook this important provision,45 and perhaps deserves criticism for
the omission,46 this fact does not indicate that the Court translated the
Constitution. The omission merely shows that the Court did not perform as
thorough a textual analysis as it might have--the Court should have
considered all of the relevant portions of the Constitution, not just the
Commerce Clause.
Lopez, to be sure, is only one case. Even if the Supreme Court did not
translate the Commerce Clause in Lopez, it might have sought to translate

41

See Lessig, supra note 5, at 195.
Lop ez, 51 4 U .S. at 56 4.
43
The statement also d oes not indicate that the Court would have departed from
the text to preserve the function of the C omm erce C lause. Indeed, the C ourt’s
emp hasis on the text of the Clause at the beginning of the opinion makes that
conclusion unlikely.
44
See L essig, sup ra note 5, at 197-2 01.
45
Neither the m ajority nor the dissent mentioned the Necessary and Proper
Clause. See Lop ez, 51 4 U .S. at 54 9.
46
In fairness to the Court, it should be noted that the Justices might have
overlooked the Necessary and Proper Clause because of the way the government
argued the case: the government only mentioned the Necessary and Proper Clause
in one cursory footno te in its principal brief. See Brief for Petitioner, 1994 WL
242541, at *13 n.4 (U.S. 1994), United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (No.
93-1 260 ).
42
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the Clause in other decisions. Yet, if Lopez is the best example that Lessig
can offer, translation does not appear to play a central role in Commerce
Clause cases.47
IV. The Problems with Translation
Lessig, as noted, deserves credit for recognizing that the Supreme Court
can be faithful to the Constitution in more than one way.48 The Court may
attempt to adhere to the Constitution either by following the text’s literal
meaning or by attempting to find a new meaning that preserves the text’s
original function. I disagree, however, with Lessig’s belief that translation
is better than textualism. In my view, translation has two substantial
problems that textualism does not: it is unnecessary and it is overly
difficult.
A. The Need for Translation
No one would deny that legal rules, even those in the Constitution,
might become antiquated after two centuries. The Seventh Amendment, for
example, still requires a jury trial in any civil case involving more than
twenty dollars,49 even though twenty dollars is not worth nearly as much
now as it was in 1791 when the Amendment took effect. The Supreme
Court, however, does not have to update constitutional provisions through
translation in order to deal with problems caused by the passage of time.
Instead, when *1204 developments warrant a change in the Constitution’s
text, Congress and the states may amend it under the procedures stated in
Article V.50
Amendments have updated antiquated portions of the Constitution on
a number of occasions. For example, after modern transportation allowed
the President to travel more quickly to Washington, the Twentieth
Amendment moved inauguration day to a date closer to the election.51
Likewise, when the government needed more revenue than the original

47

See Steven G. Calabresi, The Tradition of the W ritten Co nstitution: A
Comm ent on Professor Lessig’s Theory of Translation, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1435,
1436-54 (1997) (arguing that mo st of the Supreme C ourt’s important cases have not
involved translation).
48
See su pra P art II.
49
See U .S. Co nst. ame nd. V II.
50
See id . art. V (stating the amendme nt procedure).
51
See id. amend. XX; John Nagle, A Twentieth Amendment Parable, 72 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 470, 483-89 (1997) (describing the history of the adoption of the T wentieth
Amendment).
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rules on taxation realistically could produce,52 the Sixteenth Amendment
empowered Congress to tax income.53
Lessig does not address the alternative of amending the Constitution in
Translating Federalism. 54 He might respond, however, by arguing that the
Article V amendment process cannot take translation’s place because
adopting an amendment is an onerous undertaking and thus seldom
occurs.55 This line of reasoning, however, is not very convincing for two
reasons.
First, the difficulty of amending the Constitution should not be
overstated. In the 209 years since the Constitution’s ratification in 1789,
we have had twenty-seven amendments. History thus shows that Congress
and the States can change the Constitution when they really consider
changes to be necessary.
Second, even if cumbersome, the amendment process still can suffice
as a substitute for translation because the Constitution needs very little
updating. Much of the Constitution has a timeless quality that no one sees
a pressing need to change. Although the Framers should have thought more
carefully when drafting some parts of the Constitution,56 they generally
chose rules that we all can live with today even when read literally. As a
result, the difficulty of amending the Constitution does not matter a great
deal because we seldom have reason to invoke the process.
Ironically, if employed regularly, the translation technique actually
might hinder efforts to modernize the Constitution. Political branches of
the government might see no need for a constitutional amendment that
would protect a sphere of state power in the area of economic regulation if
the Court strived to protect states’ rights by translating the Commerce
Clause. In the absence of translation, Congress and the states would be

52

See U .S. Co nst. art. I, § 9 (prohibiting unapportioned direct taxes); Pollock
v. Farm ers’ Loan & Tru st Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895) (striking down an income
statute as an unap portioned direct tax).
53
See U .S. Co nst. ame nd. X VI.
54
Lessig mentions amendment of the Constitution only once, stating in passing
that the Supreme Court must defend “commitment[s]” in the original Constitution
“until changed by amendment.” See Lessig, supra note 5, at 177 -78.
55
See Stephen M. Griffin, The Problem of Constitutional Change, 70 Tul. L.
Rev. 2121, 21 36 (199 6); Klarman, supra note 20, at 387. Other writers have
advanced variations of this argument in explaining why the Supreme Court has
played such a substantial role in creating constitutional law.
56
The twenty d ollar limitation in the Seventh Am endment is an example .
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forced to confront problems presented by the antiquation of the Constitution.
*1205 B. The Difficulty of Translation
In addition to being unnecessary, the translation process that Lessig
describes leaves many other problems unresolved. One concern is
uncertainty. How is the Court to know when conditions have changed
enough to make necessary the translation of a provision? If the Court
decides to translate, what meaning should it adopt? How should the
Court’s observers evaluate translations?57 I doubt that the Court ever will
provide convincing answers to these questions.
Another problem, which Lessig himself observes, is that translations
often might appear to be politically motivated.58 When the Court starts to
depart from the text, it sometimes seems as if the Court is abandoning its
judicial role and is becoming a legislature.59 For this reason, as Lessig
observes, the Court often must use covert tools to accomplish translations
that it desires.60 The Court cannot simply state that it is updating the
Constitution.
The textualist approach, combined with the possibility of amendments,
does not raise these concerns to the same extent. Although words can be
ambiguous and politics certainly can influence how the Supreme Court
reads the Constitution--even when it purports to follow literally the
text--the textualist approach still raises less controversy. The public knows
that judges must apply written legal rules and generally feels comfortable
evaluating the judiciary’s work. Judges, accordingly, may cite candidly the
Constitution’s text as the basis for their decisions, as the Supreme Court did
in the first paragraph of Lopez. For these reasons, textualism remains a
better method of maintaining fidelity to the Constitution than does
translation.
V. Conclusion
Despite these difficulties with two of the central claims in Translating
Federalism: United States v Lopez, Lessig has done an invaluable service
in investigating alternative methods of showing fidelity to the Constitution
57

See generally Sanford Levinson, Translation: Who Needs It?, 65 Fordham L.
Rev. 1457, 1468 (1997) (discussing problems with the practice of translation in the
abstract).
58
See L essig, sup ra note 5, at 174-7 6.
59
See id .
60
See id . at 185 .
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when time has dated its provisions. He has argued convincingly that the
Justices might reach different understandings of the Constitution, not
through trickery,61 but through different conceptions of what it means for
them to uphold and defend the Constitution.

61

See Gregory E. M aggs, Innova tion in Constitutional Law: The Right to
Education and the Tricks of the Trade, 86 Nw . U. L. Rev. 1038 (199 2) (criticizing
unde rhand ed m ethod s of achieving d esired results in co nstitutional law case s).

